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Abstract 
 
As much as environmental problems manifest themselves as problems with the natural 
environment, environmental problems—and their solutions—are ultimately social and 
behavioral in nature.  Just as the natural sciences provide a basis for understanding the need 
for environmental policy and informing its design, the social sciences also contribute in 
significant ways to the understanding of the behavioral sources of environmental problems, 
both in terms of individual incentives and collective action challenges.  In addition, the social 
sciences have contributed much to the understanding of the ways that laws and other 
institutions can be designed to solve environmental problems. In this paper, we distill core 
intellectual frameworks from among the social sciences that scaffold modern environmental 
policy in industrialized country contexts—focusing on key contributions principally from 
political science, economics, psychology, and sociology to the analysis of environmental 
problems and their solutions. These frameworks underlie how environmental problems are 
defined at multiple scales and the conceptualization and empirical testing of policy solutions 
that seek to shape human behavior in ways that improve environmental quality and promote 
sustainable economic growth. With the planet facing continued environmental threats, 
improving environmental policy decision making depends on the insights and frameworks of 
social science research in addition to those of the natural sciences. 
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Starting as early as the middle of the twentieth century, public values toward the 
environment have shifted greatly across the developed world.  Both elites and members of the 
public have increasingly grown aware of and concerned about harms to public health and the 
environment from industrialization and urbanization (Inglehart, 1997). A series of new 
political and governmental institutions, ranging from specialized government regulatory 
agencies to green political parties to well-established nongovernmental advocacy 
organizations, have come into existence, and, in many countries, extensive laws and 
regulations have been established to address environmental concerns. In the name of 
environmental justice, marginalized communities have voiced their concerns and organized 
themselves in increasingly nuanced ways to challenge untenable status quos in their local 
backyards. Increasing international attention has also emerged over global environmental 
problems, including climate change and its associated implications for natural disasters, 
agricultural production, and ecosystem viability. 
The contributions of the natural sciences to advancing environmental policy have been 
apparent in multiple ways—not the least being in the visible integration of scientific expertise 
into the identification of environmental problems and the understanding of the chemical, 
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biological, and ecological relationships that underlie these problems.  But at the same time, 
the social sciences have likewise made many contributions to the understanding of the 
sources of environmental problems, identifying them principally in individual and collective 
human behavior.  The social sciences have also contributed much to understanding the ways 
that laws and other institutions can be designed to solve environmental problems—and the 
opportunities and challenges associated with implementation.  With the planet facing 
continued environmental threats, policy research related to the environment depends in 
important ways on the insights and frameworks of social science research in addition to 
research from the natural sciences.  As much as environmental problems may manifest 
themselves as problems with the natural environment, in reality environmental problems—
and their solutions—are ultimately social and behavioral ones. 
In this paper, we distill core social science frameworks that undergird modern 
environmental policy analysis in industrialized country contexts—focusing on key 
contributions from political science, economics, psychology, and sociology. In so doing, we 
recognize that, as an umbrella term, the “social sciences” encompass a heterogeneous group 
of disciplines, each operating according to different sets of underlying assumptions, methods, 
and norms as knowledge producing, epistemic communities. A variety of social science 
disciplines, including anthropology, geography, and political ecology, have contributed key 
conceptual, normative, and empirical insights to understanding environmental politics, 
governance, and development. In this paper, we focus on a subset of social sciences that have 
been central to the approaches embraced by policymakers and analysts situated at the 
forefront of making environmental policy decisions in the increasingly technocratic settings 
of the developed world.  In this respect, our discussion centers on those frameworks that 
underlie how environmental problems are defined at multiple scales and the 
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conceptualization and empirical testing of policy solutions that seek to shape human behavior 
in ways that improve environmental quality and promote sustainable economic growth. As 
policies and institutions developed in industrialized contexts diffuse—for better or worse—to 
emerging economies seeking to establish or enhance their own domestic regulatory states, 
there is an even greater need for scholars, students, and practitioners to reflect on the 
underlying disciplinary insights and assumptions upon which such approaches are based—
and to discern both the strengths and limitations of transferring policies, laws, norms, and 
other institutions across geophysical and political borders and institutional contexts.  The 
social sciences we review here have been pivotal to the analysis of environmental policy 
decisions in many settings around the world. 
 
I. Environmental Problems 
 
Central to the study and practice of any domain of public policy is defining the 
problem to be addressed (Bardach & Patashnik, 2015). How environmental problems are 
framed may shape the set of policy alternatives proposed as possible solutions or the 
outcomes that policy can achieve.  
Under one framing, environmental quality is an intrinsic moral good—a right or 
interest that inheres in nature itself, irrespective of the value humans place on ecosystems, 
species, or environmental conditions (Naess, 1973; Rolston, 1988; Attfield, 2014). Such a 
view undergirded the New Zealand government’s decision in 2017 to designate the 
Whanganui river—the country’s third-largest—as a living entity, affording it the same legal 
rights as a person (Gordon 2018). Under another conception of value, environmental quality 
constitutes a fundamental human right, a building block of individual capabilities (Holland, 
	4		
2008). Still another way of conceiving environmental problems has been closely associated 
with aspirations for sustainable development or a “steady-state” economy (Daly, 1977).  
The 1987 Brundtland Commission report, for example, articulated a vision for 
“development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987; Mazmanian & Kraft, 2009).  More recently, the pursuit of sustainable 
development, including transitions to less carbon- and resource-intensive economies, has 
diffused into the UN’s 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development via seventeen Sustainable 
Development Goals, which integrate environmental criteria alongside poverty alleviation, 
security, and gender equality related goals, previously central to the Millenium Development 
Goals. 
Concerns about environmental quality have often overlapped with broader concerns  
about social justice and inequality. Less powerful actors, including Indigenous peoples, racial 
and ethnic minorities, and economically disadvantaged communities, have historically 
struggled to gain recognition of both existing and emergent environmental problems in their 
backyards—from the siting of toxic waste sites and pipelines to the after-effects of hydraulic 
fracturing on drinking water safety and even contamination by genetically modified 
organisms (Taylor, 2014; Konisky, 2015; Bullard, 2018).  These same actors have likewise 
faced uphill battles to design and advance policy solutions that effectively redress these 
problems. Even seemingly beneficent environmental policies can strip marginalized groups 
of their property or usufruct rights to land use. For example, “fortress conservation” has been 
critiqued for preserving hot spots of biodiversity or other unique wild places, like national 
parks, at the expense of local and Indigenous peoples with historic claims to those places as 
customary fishing, foraging, farming or herding grounds (Büscher, 2016). Nevertheless, 
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despite power and resource asymmetries, otherwise disadvantaged groups or communities do 
sometimes prevail in the policy process (Starobin, 2018). 
Much social science research has focused on the factors that explain the rise of 
modern environmental movements in many countries and the growing international 
consensus that status quo environmental conditions are no longer acceptable (Andrews, 1999; 
Guha, 2000; Coglianese, 2001; Schreuers, 2003). Like other policy problems, the framing of 
environmental problems can vary across institutional, cultural, and political settings (Douglas 
& Wildavsky, 1983; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, & Braman, 2011; 
Dryzek, 2013). This may especially be a particular concern when natural scientists have yet 
to develop a research consensus on an issue or develop valid instruments to test otherwise 
unobservable biological or chemical relationships. Furthermore, when policy entrepreneurs 
have yet to to name the problem and seek solutions, adverse environmental conditions may 
never reach the public policy agenda (Kingdon, 1984).  
Once environmental policy issues have reached a place on the policy agenda,  social 
science research has contributed in important ways to the understanding of the sources of 
environmental problems by governmental officials and policy analysts. We focus in this 
section on social science understandings of the principal sources of environmental problems 
understood as the negative byproducts of economic activity—pollution—and other 
unintended consequences of that activity which pose risks to human health, loss of 
environmental amenities, damage to ecosystems, or resource-based reductions in quality of 
human life. How society can, and ought to, account for, prevent, or adapt to environmental 
and natural resource damages becomes the core problem for environmental policy to solve. 
We highlight here some of the most salient concepts that social scientists have contributed to 
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the understanding of the sources of environmental problems which make up the foundation 
for environmental policy analysis. 
 
A. Externalities and Transaction Costs 
 
Economists’ conceptualization of environmental problems as a form of market failure 
has become widely accepted. Although markets in principle allocate goods and services 
efficiently, market failures can arise when transactions do not accurately reflect the full value 
of goods and services either to the parties to those transactions or to third parties who are 
affected by them. Environmental problems take the form of a market failure known as 
negative externalities—the imposition of harmful effects to third parties as a result of the 
production or consumption of a good. These externalities, or spillovers, are not reflected in 
the price of goods and services, and hence the relevant goods and services are oversupplied in 
the market from the standpoint of society overall. If the price of coal, for example, fails to 
reflect the full costs borne by society associated with its production, then coal would be, in 
effect, artificially cheaper than it should be, leading more people to buy it than would be 
desirable from the standpoint of overall social welfare. If the coal industry could be forced to 
“internalize” these social costs, consumers would receive a more accurate price signal of the 
total costs (private and societal) associated with coal—compelling them to make different 
choices, such as using less coal or seeking out alternative energy technologies that may have 
fewer externalities (such as wind and solar) and which would then be more cost-competitive.  
At a micro-level, externalities can be understood by reference to economist Ronald 
Coase’s well-known parable of a farmer and a rancher—a puzzle based on a conflict between 
two neighbors that provides a metaphor and analytic framework for understanding negative 
externalities (Coase, 1960).  The Coase Theorem suggests that markets fail in the face of 
	7		
externalities largely due to the existence of transaction costs (Zerbe & McCurdy, 1999), for if 
transaction costs did not exist, the relevant parties could achieve an efficient allocation of 
resources (Coase, 1960; Ellickson, 1986). In Coase’s parable-world (without transaction 
costs), the farmer and rancher would bargain between themselves to minimize the sum of 
both the damages from cattle straying into the farmer’s crops and the costs of damage 
avoidance, such as building a fence. In reality, of course, as Coase himself understood, there 
do exist very real transaction costs associated with gathering information, negotiating 
agreements, and resolving disputes over pollution and the use of natural resources. The 
existence of these transaction costs means that many negative spillovers to market 
transactions will occur because it is too costly for the affected parties—often many thousands 
upon thousands of people, not just an individual farmer and rancher—to negotiate “win-win” 
agreements. 
 
B. Public Goods and Commons Problems 
 
Environmental problems like pollution affect large numbers of people, although the 
impact that any single polluting source has on any single individual within a large affected 
population may only be quite modest, even if in the aggregate, across all affected individuals, 
these adverse impacts are quite large. The asymmetry between the individual and collective 
impact of many environmental harms gives rise to the well-known problem of collective 
action (Hardin, 1982; Olson, 1965). This problem arises when each individual member of an 
affected group does not have enough at stake relative to the costs of avoiding the externality 
(or of mobilizing pressure to have a polluting source move or invest in pollution control). It is 
often rational under such circumstances for individuals to free-ride on the efforts of others. 
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Collective action problems derive from the fact that many environmental amenities are public 
goods: that is, they are non-rivalrous (use by one person does not deplete from others) and 
non-excludable (cannot be kept from those who do not contribute to or pay for them). 
Environmental quality often possesses the characteristics of a public good; everyone can 
breathe clean air without having paid for it. 
 Ecosystems and natural resources also often possess the characteristics of public 
goods. Garrett Hardin (1968) showed how the public-goods nature of natural resources can 
lead to what he called the “tragedy of the commons” (Feeny et al., 1990). When resources are 
shared in common and are non-excludable, it is individually rational for all the users of the 
resource to maximize their short-run gains from resource use and extraction—say, to graze as 
many cattle as possible—which leads to crowding, over-use, and eventual degradation of 
shared natural resources. Although all public goods problems involve issues related to goods 
possessing the dual characteristics of being non-rivalrous and non-excludable, many 
commons problems arise from the attributes of a common pool resource being non-
excludable but rival in consumption—meaning that use by one person makes that same 
resource unavailable to another (or potentially diminishes the overall quality of the resource) 
(Ostrom, 1990, 2008). Open ocean fisheries are a classic example of a common pool 
resource; boats “race to fish” to catch as many fish as possible, and fish taken by one vessel 
leave the fish stock depleted for subsequent fishing boats in the area, and it is challenging, if 
not impossible, to exclude boats from fishing in open waters. 
Still, some empirical social science research suggests that the “tragedy of the 
commons” is not inevitable (McCay & Acheson, 1987; Ostrom, 1990, 2008; Apostle et al., 
2002).  Under certain conditions, people can interact with common pool resources or other 
public goods in ways that counteract the tendency to free-ride, even absent governmental 
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intervention. Such community-based self-regulation of local common pool resources can take 
on a diversity of institutional forms, involving a blend of formal and informal rules and 
customary norms—scaffolded by incentives and sanctions to elicit compliance—including 
shaming, social exclusion, and excommunication.  By and large, however, the broad decline 
in environmental quality in many countries, along with the emergence of wicked 
environmental problems such as climate change, tends to be consistent with the “tragedy of 
the commons” account and the free-riding tendency of various social actors (individuals, 
businesses, nations). 
Natural science has shown how the decline of a single species or natural resource can 
cause major damage to or changes in an ecosystem. When the population of a species that 
makes up a fishery declines, for example, it may lead to a collapse not only of the species 
itself but it may also create a threat to the entire ecosystem. The effects of scarcity on 
ecosystems are sufficiently well established that natural scientists have at times forecasted 
eventual global environmental collapse as many species and resources disappear (Ehrlich, 
1968). By contrast with the natural science perspective which sees scarcity as an important 
environmental problem, from the perspective of social sciences, particularly economics, 
scarcity can actually increase the value of a good or service and may prompt efforts to 
preserve it.  This occurs with  private goods (that is, goods that individuals can possess to the 
exclusion of others) because scarcity makes them more valuable, assuming constant demand. 
The increase in their value can, in turn, provide incentives for individuals to invest in new 
ways to protect or expand the private resource or to make other technological innovations 
(Simon, 1977). 
Broadly, patterns of economic development have sometimes been seen to follow a 
pattern of increased scarcity or other environmental degradation to be followed by subsequent 
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efforts at preservation. The Kuznets curve refers to a pattern showing that as economies 
industrialize and achieve a peak in income and consumption growth, environmental pollution 
actually begins to decrease, implying that economic growth might ultimately benefit the 
environment (Kuznets, 1955; Fiorino, 2018a). Inglehart’s (1977) theory of post-materialism 
reflects a similar pattern, as populations have historically mobilized environmental political 
action after their basic material needs have been met. Despite these trends, “leapfrogging” 
has also occurred in several developing economies, wherein economic actors will skip over 
the use of polluting industrial technologies in favor of their more environmentally-friendly 
counterparts. In this way, developing countries are often said to face the possibility of 
“tunneling through” the environmental Kuznets curve by learning from the mistakes of the 
wealthy, industrialized nations (Munasighe, 1999). 
These kinds of dynamics, however, do not appear to occur without some kind of 
governmental intervention to compel polluters to bear the costs of environmental 
improvement. They especially do not apply in the same way to global public goods, where 
international institutions are weaker. Climate change, for example, results from scarcity 
occurring in terms of an atmosphere free of high levels of carbon dioxide, methane, and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). Scarcity in this sense—that is, of a clean atmosphere—does not 
automatically generate price signals or other market incentives to try to protect the planet 
from warming. On the contrary, each actors’ principal incentives are to let someone else bear 
the costs of reducing GHG emissions. Meaningful benefits of reductions in GHGs will only 
accrue if many actors (individuals, companies, and countries) reduce their emissions. Each 
actor might reasonably ask why it should incur extra costs of emissions reductions if others 
are not also doing so. Furthermore, if others do in fact reduce emissions, the benefits from 
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their reductions cannot be excluded from those actors who did not reduce. With public goods, 
market signals by themselves cannot erase the incentive to free ride. 
 
II. Policy Solutions  
 
Whether environmental problems are understood in terms of the ill effects of pollution 
and resource depletion, or in terms of the more recent emphasis on sustainability, it is clear 
that they do not emerge in a vacuum. They manifest from the interaction of human activities 
with the environment, often arising from very complex, dynamic systems involving the 
interaction of economic and social behavior with the natural environment (Matson, Clark, & 
Andersson, 2016). Individuals, groups, businesses, and states endeavor to extract value from 
natural resources for a range of valuable purposes, but in the process they can degrade or 
exhaust those resources. 
Understanding these underlying causes of environmental problems suggests a general 
approach to solving those problems.  When environmental problems are understood as 
externalities of economic activity, then the general solution will lie in finding ways to ensure 
that individuals and businesses internalize those externalities. Although this general solution 
seems straightforward in concept, determining how best to motivate the internalization of 
externalities raises challenging policy issues.  We consider here the contributions of social 
science to two main issues integral to environmental policy analysis: (1) the identification of 
the policy criteria against which solutions should be chosen or assessed, and (2) the general 
advantages and disadvantages of different environmental policy instruments. 
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A. Criteria and values  
 
A perennial question in environmental policy analysis is, “How safe is safe?” This 
question arises most clearly in determining how stringent various limits on pollution should 
be set in government regulations, but in a fundamental way it represents the core question 
undergirding almost all important environmental policy decisions. It is a question without an 
easy, uncontested answer, even though too often scholars and policymakers seem to treat 
“safety” or “environmental protection” as if they are self-evident concepts or ones that can be 
determined simply by marshaling forth scientific evidence.  
This tendency has manifested itself in recent years in scholars’ and policymakers’ 
advocacy of a “risk-based” approach to regulation (Bounds, 2010; Wiener, 2010; Black, 
2008), with the implication being that policy decisions can automatically follow from a clear 
and rigorous scientific understanding of effects on human health or ecological viability. But 
natural science by itself cannot determine how (or how stringently) environmental policy 
should be made, as policy determinations call for making normative judgments in addition to 
gathering scientific information (Coglianese & Marchant, 2004).  To be coherent, any risk-
based approach to environmental regulation needs to be grounded in a clear articulation of 
normative values or policy criteria (Paoli & Wiles, 2015; Rothstein et al., 2006; Finkel & 
Golding, 1995). Principled environmental decision-making depends on choices about how 
much pollution should be deemed acceptable—or, more generally, by what criteria should 
environmental policy decisions be guided.  
A variety of potential criteria can be discerned throughout the policy-analytic social 
science literature, although any thorough consideration of them will require some exploration 
of moral or political philosophy. For present purposes, we begin with a key criterion from 
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standard welfare economics—namely, efficiency—and then proceed to discuss cost-
effectiveness and feasibility as two major alternatives to efficiency. We then discuss equity as 
another vital criterion not captured by efficiency or cost-effectiveness, and perhaps even in 
tension with such economic criteria (Okun 1975).    
Efficiency takes into account not only the benefits of environmental policy in terms of 
reductions in harm, but it also factors in and seeks to balance those benefits with the costs of 
achieving them.  It does so in two ways.  The first way follows the concept of Pareto 
efficiency, which demands that a policy make at least some individual better off but without 
making any individual worse off.  It has sometimes been hypothesized that Pareto efficiency 
can be achieved with respect to environmental policy through supposed “win-win” options 
that deliver improvements in the environment as well as cost-savings or other private returns 
to businesses (Porter & van der Linde, 1995).  But empirical evidence suggests that such win-
win opportunities are relatively rare and, in any case, cannot achieve anything close to the 
full internalization of all negative externalities (Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995).   
 The second, and more commonly accepted, test of efficiency is known as Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency. Under this test, more than just literal win-win options can be efficient. The 
Kaldor-Hicks test also accepts as efficient any option where the “winners” under a policy 
(say, those whose water source becomes cleaner) benefit in the aggregate in an amount 
greater than the costs the policy will impose on the “losers” (say, those businesses that must 
pay to install equipment to reduce their water pollution).  This test calls for the estimation of 
net benefits, which is what is usually applied in benefit-cost analyses of environmental 
policies (Gramlich, 1990). 
 The application of an efficiency test, though, raises a host of analytical and 
methodological challenges. One initial challenge involves identifying and characterizing the 
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underlying risks to be addressed. The enterprise of risk assessment has been largely driven by 
natural sciences, but not exclusively so (Stern & Fineberg, 1996; Jasanoff, 1987). It is also an 
enterprise that is crucial even when relying on policy criteria other than efficiency.  
But when an efficiency test applies, any expected reduction in risks from different 
policy alternatives must be valued or monetized, either by revealed-preference methods (e.g., 
extrapolating from how labor markets offer a wage premium for riskier jobs) (Cropper et al., 
2011; Viscusi, 1993; Viscusi & Aldy, 2003) or by stated-preference or contingent valuation 
methods (e.g., relying on social-science surveys to estimate individuals’ willingness-to-pay 
for improvements in environmental conditions) (Carson et al., 1992; Covello & Mumpower, 
1985). Often environmental policies deliver their risk reduction benefits years or decades into 
the future—something that is especially the case for policies that aim to reduce cancer-
causing pollutants, as their effects can have long latency periods. In such instances, the 
monetized estimates of all policy impacts will be converted into present value terms, raising 
the need to identify an appropriate discount rate to use in converting estimates to present-
value terms (Revesz, 1999). 
 The efficiency test—and the resulting use of benefit-cost analysis to determine 
whether that test is met—has also raised normative critiques and questions which hold 
implications either more narrowly for various methodological choices or more broadly about 
whether to use benefit-cost analysis at all (Bronsteen et al., 2013; Adler & Posner 2006; 
Ackerman & Heinzerling, 2005; Kelman, 1981). Some of these questions center on how to 
value a policy’s impacts on future generations (Arrow et al., 2013; Brown Weiss, 1990) or on 
individuals from countries other than those of the policymaker (Rowell & Wexler, 2014).  
Others ask how to value impacts on natural resources that go beyond “use value” to humans, 
such as whether and how to incorporate “non-use” or “existence” value (e.g., the value of just 
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knowing that certain wilderness areas are protected, even if never planning to travel to them) 
(Mendelsohn & Olmstead, 2009). In some societies, indigenous or aboriginal cultures view 
these valuation choices—as well as more fundamental epistemological assumptions—in ways 
different from members of industrialized cultures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1983; Berkes et al., 
2006; Bohensky & Maru, 2011). Even within industrialized cultures, significant differences 
can exist in how lay people and experts view different risks (Slovic et al., 1981; Wynne, 
1996).  
 These normative and methodological issues arise principally when the efficiency 
criterion is applied to environmental policy decisions. By and large, other applicable policy 
criteria will dispense with the need to make the valuation judgments involved when benefits 
must be monetized, as the efficiency test demands.  One alternative along these lines is the 
criterion of cost-effectiveness, which also accounts for the costs of a policy but does not call 
for balancing those costs against benefits, and thus does not necessitate any attempt to 
monetize benefits such as avoided mortality or morbidity or environmental amenities.  The 
cost-effectiveness criterion would point decision-makers toward policies that can achieve the 
desired level of environmental or health improvement at the lowest cost.  
 Others have proposed using feasibility as a policy criterion, seeking to maximize 
environmental protection within the constraint of what is feasible (Driesen, 2005; but see 
Masur & Posner, 2010).  The feasibility criterion is a close cousin to the precautionary 
principle, which has been widely urged as the better way to make policy decisions about 
environmental risk (Freestone & Hey, 1996). In general, the precautionary principle shifts the 
burden of proof on those who create potential externalities—for example, those who create 
new products or processes that could harm the environment or human health.  It forbids 
economic activities until they can be shown to impose no externalities.  Although the 
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precautionary principle possesses considerable appeal to policymakers and members of the 
public, some scholars have questioned its coherence and wisdom (Sunstein, 2005). 
Whether the criterion selected for a particular policy analysis might be efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, or feasibility, policy analysis often focuses just on the aggregate effects of 
environmental policies—that is, on their overall benefits or costs—not on how those effects 
are distributed (Robinson, Hammitt, & Zeckhauser, 2016). From the standpoint of welfare 
economics, the principal concern with market failures lies with the overall social costs of 
economic activity; when externalities exist, pollution becomes over-produced (or natural 
resources become over-exploited). But environmental problems also raise critical 
distributional fairness concerns as well. The scarcity that underlies most environmental 
problems necessarily implicates what Young (2013) calls a “problem of allocation.” This 
problem is one concerning “who gets what rather than a matter of sustainability or the 
avoidance of negative side effects” (Young, 2013:12).  
Equity issues are embedded in environmental problems themselves because the risks 
and environmental harms from economic activity are not equally borne by everyone in 
society (Adler, 2012). Especially palpable in this regard are socioeconomic and racial 
disparities in the imposition of the harms from industrial activity, concerns that have been 
reflected in an “environmental justice” movement in the United States and elsewhere (Cole & 
Foster, 2001).  
Equity issues also are fundamentally embedded in choices about policy solutions. The 
Coasean parable, for example, not only illustrates what a negative externality is, but it also 
reveals equity’s centrality in how rights get distributed whenever establishing policies or 
setting up legal regimes. Given the presence of transaction costs, it matters whether farmers 
are given the right to exclude others from their farmfields or ranchers are given the right to 
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allow their cattle to roam freely. Which is the fair distribution?  This question arises not just 
in parables but in the real world of policy decision-making whenever choices must be made 
between policy options that will reap benefits to some people and impose costs on still others.  
It also arises whenever tradeable emissions permit systems are established, as policymakers 
must decide to whom and in what proportion to award the initial allocation of permits 
(Young, 2013). 
Attentiveness to distributional fairness raises several other environmental policy issues 
as well. One of these centers on how tradeoffs between efficiency and equity ought to be 
resolved (Okun, 1975; Adler, 2012). Another concerns the extent to which benefits accruing 
to residents in foreign countries should be factored into the policy calculus, a particularly 
salient issue in the context of global climate change policy (Gayer & Viscusi, 2016). Still 
another issue focuses on the moral obligations that present-day individuals and businesses 
owe to future generations, an issue also implicated by climate change (Brown Weiss, 1989). 
 Considerations of equity and fairness over environmental quality bear some affinity 
with the view that environmental protection is a human right. Even though rights-based 
thinking may seldom explicitly factor into formal policy analyses of environmental problems 
in many developed economies, such a view does seem to permeate much political and legal 
discourse over environmental policy. Any such right may be invoked or framed at the level of 
the individual or at the level of a community, such as in the latter case when indigenous 
peoples suffer targeted environmental degradation (Boyle, 2006; Shelton, 1991). As noted 
previously, some observers have also suggested that ecosystems or species themselves 
possess intrinsic value, if not rights, even when humans incur no instrumental harm (Naess, 
1973; Sagoff, 1988; Stone 2010). Others ask whether a human right to environmental quality 
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comes into tension with other human rights or with a commitment to democratic governance 
(Ophuls, 1977; Bartley, 2018; Fiorino, 2018b).  
 
B. Policy Instruments 
 
The principal policy criteria we have highlighted—especially efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, feasibility, and equity—are commonly used in policy analysis to inform 
decisions about a variety of possible policy responses to environmental problems.  In this 
section, we briefly review the key findings from social science research on the major tools 
available to the environmental policy maker (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & 
Medicine, 2018; Richards, 2000). All of the tools discussed here have been adopted and 
implemented by national governmental bodies, so for our present purposes we will treat such 
bodies as the key policy-makers, even though most of the instruments discussed here could 
be applied by other decision-makers, whether private or public, international or local.  
As these various policy tools have been adopted in practice, social science researchers 
have sought to understand the conditions under which each may be best implemented and the 
extent to which each proves effective in addressing environmental problems and meeting 
relevant policy criteria (Richards, 2000). A distillation of this research suggests that decision-
makers do well to consider three principal factors when deciding which tool to use: the nature 
of the environmental problem, characteristics of the industry actors or other sources of that 
problem, and the capacity of governmentl institutions to implement and enforce the tool 
(National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2018). Generally speaking, the 
more flexible the regulatory tool, the more likely it will produce outcomes that are more 
efficient or cost-effective. However, if that flexibility is not accompanied by a sufficient set 
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of incentives for businesses to improve their environmental performance—either from market 
pressures or through effective compliance monitoring and enforcement—environmental 
policy might not prove effective at all (Bennear and Coglianese, 2013; Kamieniecki & Kraft, 
2013). 
We discuss the tools below roughly in the order with which they have emerged in 
response to environmental problems in many countries, with interest in more flexible 
strategies seeming to grow over time (Press, 2007). In many countries, the initial response to 
environmental problems tended to focus mainly on liability followed by the imposition of 
“command and control” standards, such as means-based and performance-based regulation 
(Andrews, 1999). Concerns about the bluntness and costs of these approaches eventually led 
to interest in more flexible regulatory designs, such as market-based policy instruments and 
management-based regulation (Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, 1998; Bennear and Coglianese, 
2013; Rabe, 2018a). Policymakers and scholars have also focused attention on voluntary 
programs established to encourage firms to go beyond compliance with environmental rules 
(Fiorino, 2006; Auld, Bernstein, & Cashore, 2008; Borck & Coglianese, 2009; Durant, 
Fiorino, & O’Leary, 2017). Today, all of these tools are deployed to varying degrees by most 
governments around the world. 
 
1. Ex-post liability 
 
One tool for addressing environmental problems is to impose liability on polluters after 
they cause harm to others.  Sometimes referred to as the “polluter pays” principle, ex-post 
liability can, at least in theory, provide a deterrent effect that leads polluters to adopt 
preventative measures. Although ex-post liability may be deemed appropriate for special 
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types of environmental concerns or as a general backstop to other options, such liability by 
itself is generally thought to be insufficient as a principal means of addressing environmental 
concerns, mainly for the very same kinds of reasons that environmental problems arise in the 
first place: transaction costs and the problems of collective action (Bardach & Kagan, 1982). 
Even with liability, harmed individuals will have an incentive to free ride on others, rather 
than seek their own costly forms of redress through a liability regime. This dynamic 
presumably leads to a less-than-optimal level of deterrence—and the continued existence of 
the very environmental problems policymakers seek to solve.  To overcome the shortcomings 
in ex-post liability, and in an effort to try to prevent environmental harms from occurring in 
the first place, governments have adopted protective, proactive environmental regulation.  
 
2. Means-based regulation 
 
Proactive regulation can take a variety of forms.  One form consists of rules directing 
regulated entities (e.g., businesses) to use a particular means of pollution control or to take 
other specified action to reduce environmental problems.  Sometimes characterized as 
technology or specification standards, examples of these “means standards” include 
requirements for the installation of catalytic converters on automobiles or the operation of 
emissions scrubbers on factory smokestacks.  This type of regulation is not uncommon in 
environmental policy.  Means standards generally offer greater certainty that regulated firms 
will take the desired environmentally protective action, and they may also be easier than 
other types of regulation for regulatory officials to enforce (National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering & Medicine, 2018). Despite these advantages, means standards will often be less 
cost-effective than other forms of regulation because they mandate the same, “one-size-fits-
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all” action for every regulated firm.  Some firms may not really need to take the required 
action, or they may have available to them other actions that would prove more effective or 
less costly.  
 
3. Performance-based regulation 
 
Instead of mandating means, regulation can also mandate the attainment or avoidance 
of certain outcomes—setting a goal of “what” to achieve but not specifying “how” to achieve 
it. Such a performance standard does not require the use of any particular technology or other 
action; on the contrary, it leaves the means of achieving or avoiding the required outcome up 
to the regulated firm. All that firms must do is deliver on the outcome (Coglianese, Nash, & 
Olmstead, 2003; May, 2011). An emissions limit is a common example of a performance 
standard. 
  By specifying requirements in terms of outcomes and giving firms flexibility in 
meeting those outcomes, performance standards can overcome the one-size-fits-all 
disadvantage of means standards (May, 2003). Performance standards can also better allow 
for innovation to occur (Jaffe, Newell, & Stavins, 2004). For these reasons, many social 
scientists have recommended performance standards as more cost-effective regulatory 
instruments. 
Yet performance standards are not without their disadvantages either. As a fundamental 
matter, performance standards need a reliable method for measuring firms’ satisfaction of the 
required outcome conditions. Yet sometimes measurement of outcomes can be difficult with 
respect to environmental standards.  As a practical matter, regulators typically cannot monitor 
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on an ongoing basis the emissions from every smokestack and exhaust pipe that contributes 
pollution to the air.   
Furthermore, performance standards can be susceptible to a type of gaming known as 
“teaching to the test,” which occurs when regulated firms find ways to meet the required 
outcome but in ways that work to the detriment of the larger purpose of the regulation.  An 
example can be found in the 2015 Volkswagen’s diesel scandal; the company had installed 
software that ensured their engines optimized for emissions control while connected to the 
required testing machine, but then recalibrated and spewed out more pollution when 
operating under normal, on-the-road conditions (Coglianese, 2017). Performance standards 
may also be somewhat more prone to the incidence of unintended consequences as firms use 
their flexibility in creative ways that produce new, unanticipated problems (May, 2003). 
 
4. Market Instruments 
 
Although performance standards prove more cost-effective than means standards, they 
still can be less cost-effective than so-called market-based regulatory instruments.  This is 
because performance standards can suffer from their own type of one-size-fits-all problem: 
they require uniform levels of emissions control even when the marginal costs for controlling 
those emissions can vary across different firms. Rather than demanding every firm meet the 
same emissions limit, market instruments allow for – and even provide incentives for – firms 
to choose their own level of emissions. Market instruments operate either by setting a per-
unit tax on emissions or by establishing a system of tradable emissions permits (Tietenberg, 
1985). 
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 A marginal pollution tax set at the level equal to the social costs of pollution would 
solve the Coasian bargaining problem discussed in section 1.A above and would ensure that 
firms fully internalize their externalities (Pigou, 1932). However, the precise marginal social 
cost of pollution can be difficult to determine, and while a tax provides certainty in terms of 
costs imposed on firms, it does not provide much certainty about the overall level of pollution 
that will be reduced. 
 An alternative market-based approach called emissions trading—or simply “cap and 
trade”—can provide greater certainty about the overall level of pollution reductions. Under a 
cap and trade system, an overall desired level of emissions is established and a number of 
aggregate emissions “credits” issued that total the desired level. Each individual firm then 
receives credits equaling a portion of the overall emissions level; they must keep their 
emissions below the amount allowed by the permits they possess—much like with any 
performance standard. But unlike with uniform performance standards, firms can exchange 
credits under cap and trade, thus varying the level of control each firm must achieve.  Those 
firms with lower marginal costs of control can free up some of their emissions credits by 
reducing pollution more than required and then sell excess credits to other firms with higher 
marginal costs of control, ultimately achieving the same overall level of pollution reductions 
but at a lower cost. These theoretical expectations of greater cost-effectiveness have been 
confirmed by empirical research (Cropper & Oates, 1992; Stavins, 2007).  
 Market instruments are, of course, susceptible to some of the same potential 
limitations as performance standards. They very much depend, for instance, on a reliable 
means of measuring emissions. Moreover, market-based environmental policy instruments 
may lead to another particular problem: hot spots.  If those firms that buy credits and those 
that sell credits are located in different areas, pollution levels could become more 
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concentrated in some regions. Research has also investigated whether cap and trade tends to 
disadvantage smaller firms (Newell & Rogers, 2003). 
 
5. Management-based regulation 
 
Management-based regulation does not require firms meet a specific targeted outcome 
nor even adopt any direct means that aim toward a desired outcome, but instead it mandates 
that firms collect information, develop internal plans and procedures, and engage in other 
management-related actions that aim indirectly toward reducing environmental problems 
(Bennear, 2006; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). For example, some laws direct companies using 
toxic chemicals to engage in pollution prevention planning to try to reduce their use of toxics, 
even without requiring those companies take any specific pollution prevention or control 
measures—or sometimes without even demanding that they carry out their required plans. In 
short, management-based regulation aims to solve environmental problems by spurring 
improvements in private-sector environmental management (Coglianese & Nash, 2006). 
 Management-based regulations appear to be suitable when addressing environmental 
problems where one-size-fits-all means do not exist and where monitoring outcomes is not 
feasible. It has been used, for example, to encourage reductions in the use of toxic chemicals 
and to try to prevent catastrophic industrial accidents.  Empirical evidence shows that these 
regulations can lead to improvements in some measures of environmental quality (Bennear, 
2006, 2007; Coglianese & Lazer, 2003). However, research also suggests that improvements 
induced by management-based regulations may not be long-lived. Firms appear initially to 
find low-hanging fruit once they start to manage their environmental affairs more self-
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consciously in response to management-based requirements, but over time the required 
planning appears to become more routinized and environmental improvements taper off. 
 
6. Information disclosure 
 
Another regulatory approach requires not just the gathering of information for internal 
planning purposes, but the affirmative public disclosure of certain kinds of information 
(Sunstein, 1999; Tietenberg, 1998). The U.S. Toxics Releases Inventory (TRI) regulation 
serves as a prominent example of this policy instrument.  TRI requires certain industrial 
facilities to disclose to the public the volume of toxic chemicals they release into the 
environment. Some researchers have attributed the decline over time in chemicals reported 
under TRI as a sign of the policy’s success (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008; Fung & O'Rourke, 
2000).  Others have shown that observed reductions can be explained instead by other, more 
traditional forms of regulation operating in the background or by factors other than real 
improvements in environmental performance (Poje & Horowitz, 1990; Natan & Miller, 1998; 
de Marchi & Hamilton, 2006; Bennear, 2008). Indeed, some empirical research suggests that 
the impact of toxics disclosure requirements might even depend on their combination with 
strong conventional environmental regulations and pressures from environmental groups 
(Kraft, Stephan, & Abel, 2011).  
Studies of state programs in the United States that promote the disclosure of toxic 
emissions information have failed to find evidence that disclosure has produced any 
significant effects on facilities’ environmental performance (Grant & Jones, 2004; Kraft, 
Stephan, & Abel, 2011). The precise effects, if any, of the federal TRI law remain unknown 
(Hamilton, 2005). That said, other research has shown that in other settings information 
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disclosure can sometimes contribute to at least some modest levels of environmental 
improvement (Bennear & Olmstead, 2008).  Researchers theorize that information disclosure 
can reinforce various other legal, market, and social pressures for companies to reduce 
pollution (Hamilton, 1995; Khanna, Quimio, & Bojilova, 1998; Konar & Cohen, 1997). 
Furthermore, if the aphorism that “what gets measured, gets managed” rings true, then 
information disclosure may also operate as a partial form of management-based regulation 
and induce spillover managerial changes at regulated firms (Karkkainen, 2001).  
 
7.  Subsidies 
 
The public goods nature of environmental quality can impede private financing for 
certain kinds of environmental solutions, such as water supply systems or storm-water 
management. Public financing and subsidies can fill in gaps in private financing of public 
environmental amenities. Tax credits for investments in nonrenewable sources of energy are 
another example of a type of subsidy available to address environmental problems. 
 
8. Voluntary programs 
 
A related approach is to reward firms that voluntarily adopt environmentally 
responsible actions or achieve high levels of environmental performance.  Through so-called 
voluntary environmental programs, governments sometimes offer qualifying firms technical 
assistance, awards and public recognition, special eco-labels, or specified forms of regulatory 
relief.  Examples include the U.S. government’s “Energy Star” product labeling program or 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s National Environmental Performance Track 
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partnership program (Coglianese & Nash, 2014). Some research shows that these kinds of 
voluntary programs can have a discernible effect on certain environmentally relevant metrics 
(Pizer, Morgenstern, & Shih, 2010; Morgenstern & Pizer, 2007), but because the rewards 
offered firms through these programs are typically modest, they are likely to have only 
limited value for solving most major environmental problems (Coglianese & Nash, 2014).  
 
III. Institutions 
 
Just as social science research has helped identify and evaluate different policy 
instruments for addressing environmental problems, it has also clarified several key 
institutional choices relevant to environmental policy. These include choices about the types 
of institutions that should bear the primary responsibility for addressing environmental 
problems—specifically, the public or private sector—as well as about the appropriate scale of 
policy responses—top-down or bottom-up.  In addition, social science research about policy 
decision-making has made contributions to the design of processes used to make and 
implement environmental policy.  
 
A. Public vs. private  
 
Although governments are major sources of environmental policy, a variety of non-
governmental actors also fulfill governance roles (Büthe & Mattli, 2011; Vandenbergh & 
Gilligan, 2017). Especially in societies lacking in state capacity or for problems that 
governments are unable or unwilling to address, private third parties can serve as surrogates 
for (or at times supplements to) governmental actors (Büthe, 2010). Sometimes called 
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“private regulators,” business associations or NGOs operating in this capacity derive their 
authority and legitimacy more through moral persuasion and market power than coercion or 
force (Green, 2013; Cashore et al., 2004). For example, a variety of privately created labeling 
and certification schemes have emerged to provide global consumers and businesses credible 
information and assurances related to niche preferences for more sustainable or ethical forms 
of agriculture and manufacturing (Starobin & Weinthal, 2010). These non-state schemes can 
impose means or performance standards—or any of the types of rules that governments could 
impose—but they lack the ability to mandate compliance with the threat of state-imposed 
sanctions. As a result, private forms of environmental governance will bear many similarities 
to voluntary programs adopted by governments. That said, the market pressures available to 
business associations, NGOs, and even multinational corporations like Wal-Mart can 
sometimes create incentives for compliance that rival those provided by state authority 
(Starobin, 2013). 
Social scientists have investigated why firms willingly undertake to “self-regulate” and 
voluntarily go beyond bare compliance with the law. Conventional wisdom holds that private 
certification schemes offer firms a club good—exclusive reputational benefits available only 
to those members that achieve the desired level of compliance—thereby distinguishing 
leaders from laggard competitors in their sector (Prakash & Potoski, 2006). Other incentives 
for self-regulation include product differentiation, access to markets, and, in some cases, a 
reduction in the probability of eventual governmental regulation. Researchers have sought to 
evaluate private forms of environmental governance and on occasion have found that they 
generate improvements in certain metrics, such as days in compliance with regulations and 
paperwork processing (Prakash & Potoski, 2006).  As with voluntary programs more 
generally, it has been harder for researchers to find substantively significant improvements 
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associated with these private voluntary efforts. Concerns exist about the adequacy of 
implementation of and compliance monitoring associated with non-state forms of 
environmental governance. 
In reality, the choice between private and public governance is seldom truly binary. 
Instead the public and private sectors are intertwined in environmental governance (Steinberg 
& VanDeveer, 2012). The shadow of public governance, such as through regulatory threats, 
shapes what otherwise seems to be voluntary private action (Lyon & Maxwell, 2004). In turn, 
though, public governance depends vitally on private firms for information and action 
(Coglianese, 2007). Research reveals an intertwined public-private governance, especially in 
transnational business governance interactions, with multiple actors across sectors and 
countries collaborating in the creation of private regulations while cooperating within 
existing state regulatory structures (Eberlein et al., 2014; Levi-Faur & Starobin, 2014; 
Bartley, 2011, 2018). The choice for environmental policy often is a matter of emphasis on 
one sector over the other, or in allocating different roles and responsibilities to actors from 
each sector. 
 
B. Top-down vs. bottom-up  
 
A perennial issue in environmental policy concerns the scale at which solutions should 
be sought (Young, 2002). With the exception of problems with highly localized impacts, 
environmental problems often transcend political boundaries, raising the question of whether 
the responsibility for addressing them should be assumed by national bodies or devolved to 
lower levels of scale. The choice between a top-down versus a bottom-up set of solutions 
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assumes particular significance for transnational environmental problems, such as climate 
change. 
Countries have long relied on international treaties as core policy tools employed to 
elicit compliance from states to provide global public goods, prevent environmental harms, 
and protect human rights (O’Neill, 2009; Mitchell, 2003; Susskind, 1994). Yet, in the era of 
globalization, both states and non-state actors, including businesses, perform nuanced roles 
that go beyond treaty formation, negotiation, and ratification—and often they must consider 
whether other, bottom-up policy tools, including private, voluntary initiatives or other 
innovative policy alternatives, might prove more effective (Andrews et al, 2017; Starobin, 
2018). 
 Top-down approaches to governing the global environment like multilateral treaties 
have long been the classic approach to tackling the collective action challenges associated 
with managing commons at the international scale—seeking to impose on countries a regime 
under which they make specific commitments (e.g., on ozone depletion, greenhouse gas 
reductions) related to ameliorating or preventing environmental damages if not also 
contributing funds toward their remedy, even in other jurisdictions. Yet, these approaches 
have also struggled at times with issues of effectiveness and inclusivity (Young, 1999; Haas 
et al., 1993.). Treaties require ratification at the level of the nation-state to become 
“binding”—even though they still rely upon signatories for enforcement, ultimately 
depending on the willingness and capability of state-level bureaucracies to integrate 
international ideas, norms, and institutions with domestic ones (DeSombre, 2000). 
 Top-down approaches have not only generated concerns about their effectiveness but 
also about global equity, as top-down treaties may reflect the preferences of the developed 
countries whose industrialization and development have fueled accelerated environmental 
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degradation, to the exclusion of developing and emerging economies, many of which stand to 
face more of the negative consequences like rising temperatures, sea level rise, and resource 
scarcity (Escobar, 2011; Baland & Platteau, 1996.). In addition to developing countries 
feeling left behind, affected individuals and communities—those at the bottom of the global 
economic pyramid who are likely to experience environmental harms most directly—may not 
have their interests and concerns reflected very well in top-down policy discussions.   
Although bottom-up approaches to environmental governance may ameliorate 
disadvantages of top-down approaches, when problems transcend a smaller scale, a bottom-
up approach may simply not be up to the task (Keohane & Ostrom, 1994). Furthermore, when 
governance is devolved to lower scales, a concern arises for a “race-to-the-bottom” effect, as 
local jurisdictions may have an incentive to compete for business activity through less 
stringent policy measures. A related concern is that jurisdictional or scale spillovers may 
occur; that is, as some localities or regions respond to environmental problems more 
aggressively, they may only find that they push more-polluting businesses to other 
jurisdictions with weaker policies, without fully solving the trans-boundary environmental 
problem (Wiener, 2007).  The extent to which these problems with bottom-up approaches 
manifest themselves, however, remains an open question, with some research offering 
counterexamples and theoretical reasons to question the significance of race-to-the-bottom 
effects (Vogel, 2009; Revesz, 1992).  
Although multilateral action by nations is an important component of global 
environmental governance, there is much being done to address climate change across 
varying levels of government. Transnational climate governance initiatives have emerged all 
over the world, made up of governments of all sizes and locations—including cities, states, 
countries, and regions—that are collaborating in nuanced ways to govern climate change 
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(Rabe, 2004; Hoffmann, 2011; Green, 2013; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Andonova, Hale, & 
Roger,  2017; Roger, Hale, & Andonova, 2017; Rabe, 2018b). An important issue is the 
extent to which these various bottom-up approaches can substitute for top-down strategies as 
well as how policies developed at different scales can be coordinated or integrated. 
 
C. Policy Processes  
 
Choices about policy criteria, instruments, and institutions all implicate values and 
interests over which different individuals have different preferences and views.  
Understanding how these choices should be made, and who makes them, has motivated the 
vast field of political science across all policy domeans, including environmental policy (Vig 
& Kraft, 2018). Relevant issues for environmental policy analysis include accountability and 
transparency of policy decision-making and the type and extent of participation by affected 
parties, including the broader public, in the decision-making process.  With environmental 
policy, democratic values are implicated in important, sometimes distinctive, ways, often 
because the key institutions lack traditional electoral accountability connections. At the level 
of domestic governance, for example, many pivotal institutions can be bureaucratic and 
technical in orientation—and not directly accountable through elections but through oversight 
by other electorally-based institutions. As a result, particularly relevant social science 
research has focused on the role of experts (Haas, 1992; Jasanoff, 2009), consensus-building 
in the administrative context (Coglianese, 2003) and public participation in decisions by 
regulatory bodies (Singleton, 2000; Fraser et al., 2006; Tyler & Markell, 2008). In addition, 
courts play consequential roles in shaping environmental policy at the domestic level and 
their role vis-à-vis other governmental institutions has not escaped attention (Melnick, 1983; 
Rose-Ackerman, 1995). 
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At the level of global environmental governance, what it means to secure democratic 
accountability creates further complications because typical electoral mechanisms do not 
exist and direct participation by members of the public is practically difficult to accommodate 
(Keohane, 2001; Cohen & Sabel, 2005). Accountability arises as an issue not only for the 
design of international legal institutions, such as multilateral treaties, but also for voluntary 
transnational initiatives, such as international environmental management standards or 
certification programs for sustainable forestry practices. Policy decision-making in these 
global settings tends to be fragmented and diffuse, with multiple interests at stake and 
networks of public and private actors interacting in a variety of policy venues (Slaughter, 
2005). Efforts to address the global accountability deficit can take the form of delegation 
strategies that strengthen principal-agent relationships between state representatives and 
global institutions or strategies of so-called stakeholder participation involving diverse 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations in the global policy process (Grant and 
Keohane, 2005). Accountability strategies can also be both internally and externally 
oriented—the former comprising standards that in effect govern participants in the 
transnational regime, and the latter involving efforts to build broader support for the regime 
from those outside of it but who are nevertheless affected by it (Keohane, 2003; Gulbrandsen 
& Auld, 2019). Research has suggested that information disclosure—one of the substantive 
tools for addressing environmental problems—may be deployed to promote accountability in 
global governance regimes (Büthe, 2012; Kelley & Simmons, 2019). However, it should be 
noted that increased accountability may not always lead to improvements in environmental 
performance, especially if the accountability mechanism leads a global institution to take a 
lowest-common-denominator path (Park & Kramarz, 2019). 
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Similar approaches to promoting accountability and legitimacy of environmental 
institutions,  both domestic and international, can be applied to environmental policy analysis 
itself. Analysis will have greater impact on actual decisions when it is viewed as more 
credible. Taking steps to involve others in participation in the generation of policy analysis 
not only can enhance the information base on which analysts conduct their work but can also 
make the findings of the analysis more broadly salient and trusted (Mitchell, Clark & Cash, 
2006; Matson, Clark, & Andersson, 2016).  
Finally, process choices emerge even after the analysis of and decision-making about 
environmental policy tools. How policy tools are implemented can prove as vital as how they 
are designed. Policies as they appear “on the books” do not always mirror how they are 
applied at the “street level” (Kaufman. 1967; Pressman and Wildavsky. 1984; Lipsky. 2010). 
Social science research has also contributed in important ways to the understanding of how 
policy tools are implemented and enforced (Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Hawkins, 1984; Ayres 
& Braithwaite, 1995).  
Ultimately, the processes by which policy decisions are both made and implemented 
provide the methods by which societies will solve environmental problems. The social 
sciences have made important contributions to understanding how such processes work and 
how they might be structured to generate improved environmental outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have endeavored to illuminate some of the many intellectual 
contributions from social sciences to the understanding of environmental problems and to the 
design of effective policy solutions that will change individual and collective behavior in 
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ways that enhance environmental quality. We take as given the role for the natural sciences 
in addressing environmental problems, as designing effective solutions depends on 
understanding risks and their causes. Reliable natural science research is a necessary 
foundation for developing policies to address environmental problems. Yet it is also not 
sufficient. To generate sound environmental policy decisions, governments, businesses, and 
global civil society actors also need social science research. Environmental problems and 
their solutions both involve human behavior, and they implicate key normative or policy 
questions that policy decision-makers must confront.  Effective environmental policy 
analysis, in other words, must be interdisciplinary (Mattor et al.. 2014). It must be grounded 
in research from the natural sciences as well as in the careful consideration of theories, 
concepts, and findings from the social sciences. 
The underlying causes of environmental problems can be conceptualized in relatively 
straightforward terms as a failure of individual actors to internalize externalities, but given 
the sheer number of actors, and the variety of activities they engage in, effectuating a 
meaningful internalization of environmental costs will often prove challenging and complex. 
Devising effective solutions requires a nuanced understanding of the complex economic and 
social sources of human-induced problems, as well as sources of countervailing pressure 
because, most often, environmental harm occurs from people acting in ways that are privately 
rational but collectively suboptimal. Those individuals and businesses currently imposing 
spillovers on others can be expected to resist efforts that would force them to internalize 
those costs, and if they generally possess greater resources or are better organized than 
environmental cost-bearers, the distribution of environmental amenities may tend to mirror 
that of other resources.  
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An awareness that environmental harms are not evenly distributed, whether in 
individual societies or around the world, reinforces the relevance of finding ways to ensure a 
more complete elaboration of environmental policy’s impacts and a search for still better 
ways improving the well-being of all members of society. Social science’s longstanding 
interest in collective decision-making not only illuminates the causes of environmental 
problems but helps identify the tools and processes needed to solve them more optimally and 
fairly. 
In the future, social science research will continue to be needed to explore 
environmental problems, solutions, and institutions. Additional research can help refine and 
improve each of the concepts and theories presented in this paper. Policy analysis could 
benefit, for example, from still more refined work on the comparative performance of 
different policy tools and the conditions for their success. In addition, as social and economic 
conditions are in constant flux—as exemplified recently by the emergence of populism and 
nationalism on multiple continents—these changing conditions will need to be studied for 
their implications for analyzing environmental policy.  
Changing natural conditions will also prompt the need for additional social science 
research. It will also foster the need for research that more fully integrates the natural 
sciences with the social sciences. For example, as climate change further strains liveability 
conditions in many parts of the world—such as due to water shortages or the ravages of 
floods and storms—social conflicts can be expected to be exacerbated. Under such 
conditions, societies are likely to face the need for policy tools that not merely seek to 
prevent or mitigate environmental problems but to adapt to them. Such tools could include 
those needed to manage the relocation of entire communities, undertakings that will depend 
on integrative research if they are to be executed effectively. As changing environmental 
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conditions place societies under stress, the need for rigrous social science research as part of 
environmental policy analysis will not disappear. 
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